Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1063 (9th ed. But while district irregularities may provide strong indicia of a potential gerrymander, they do no more than that. This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy. The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. v. EVAN MILLIGAN, ET AL. The Court appears to accept this, and it does not purport to disturb the law of vote dilution in any way. ); id., at 518 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Wygant, 476 U. S., at 280282 (plurality opinion); id., at 286 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Today, the Court recognizes a new cause of action under which a State's electoral redistricting plan that includes a configuration "so bizarre" that it "rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race [without] sufficient justification" will be subjected to strict scrutiny. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 752, n. 18 (1973)-but because they are objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines. The plaintiffs in UJO-members of a Hasidic community split between two districts under New York's revised redistricting plan-did not allege that the plan, on its face, was so highly irregular that it rationally could be understood only as an effort to segregate voters by race. It is evident to me, however, that what North Carolina did was precisely tailored to meet the objection of the Attorney General to its prior plan. What trade-offs are involved in deciding to have a single large, centrally located facility instead of See Richmond v. J. argument that racial gerrymandering poses no constitutional difficulties when the lines drawn favor the minority, since equal protection analysis is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification, Richmond v. J. To begin with, the complaint nowhere alleges any type of stigmatic harm. And while Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 500 (1954), held that requiring segregation in public education served no legitimate public purpose, consideration of race may be constitutionally appropriate in electoral districting decisions in racially mixed political units. Shaw v. Reno Jennifer Denise Rogers . Appellants stated an equal protection claim by alleging that North Carolina's reapportionment scheme was so irrational on its face that it could be understood only as an effort to segregate voters based on race, and that separation lacks sufficient justification. The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. See 425 U. S., at 142, n. 14. 808 F. 2 See Karcher, 462 U. S., at 748 (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("If they serve no purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that may occupy a position of strength at a particular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of, duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power over the electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group. 42 U. S. C. 1973(b). As long as members of racial groups have the commonality of interest implicit in our ability to talk about concepts like <"minority voting strength," and "dilution of minority votes," cf.Thornburg v. Gingles(1986), and as long as racial bloc voting takes place, legislators will have to take race into account in order to avoid dilution of minority voting strength in the districting plans they adopt. to Juris. Finally, like New York, North Carolina reacted by modifying its plan and creating additional majority-minority districts. The Court ruled that claims of racial redistricting must be held to a standard of strict scrutiny, meaning that any law that results in classification by race must have a compelling government interest, be narrowly tailored to meet that goal, and be the least restrictive means for achieving that interest. Thus, state legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens on account of race-whether it contains an explicit distinction or is "unexplainable on grounds other than race," Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266-must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. See id., at 55,58. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976). No.1, 458 U. S. 457, 485 (1982). The determinative consideration for the Court was that the law, though ostensibly race neutral, on its face "embod[ied] no exercise of judgment and rest[ed] upon no discernible reason" other than to circumvent the prohibitions of the Fifteenth Amendment. The parties' arguments about whether the plan was necessary to avoid dilution of black voting strength in violation of 2 of the Act and whether the State's interpretation of 2 is unconstitutional were not developed below, and the issues remain open for consideration on remand. 461 (EDNC 1992). North Carolina's decision to create a majority-minority district can be explained as an attempt to meet this objection. That claim, the majority concluded, was barred by United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977) (UJO). In our view, the court used the wrong analysis. 430 U. S., at 162-163 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ.) Id., at 141-142; see also Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 370-371 (1975) (annexation that reduces percentage of blacks in population satisfies 5 where postannexation districts "fairly reflect" current black voting strength). )-forecloses the claim we recognize today. Appellee Reno . Dissenting Opinion. It is against this background that we confront the questions presented here. Accordingly, we have asked that an identifiable group demonstrate more than mere lack of success at the polls to make out a successful gerrymandering claim. Allen v. State Bd. It was 160 miles long and generally corresponded to the Interstate 85 corridor. 634 SHAW v. RENO Opinion of the Court tutes an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. There are three financing options: 1. Majority Opinion/Decision. Under either formulation, it is irrefutable that appellants in this proceeding likewise have failed to state a claim. See App. But numerous North Carolinians did. Did North Carolina residents claim that the 1990 redistricting plan discriminated on the basis of race raise a valid constitutional issue under the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Its central purpose is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race. 408 (E.D.N.C. 4 The Court's opinion suggests that African-Americans may now be the only group to which it is unconstitutional to offer specific benefits from redistricting. 15, 1. The district even has inspired poetry: "Ask not for whom the line is drawn; it is drawn to avoid thee." App. Three Justices approved the New York statute, in part, precisely because it adhered to traditional districting principles: "[WJe think it permissible for a State, employing sound districting principles such as compactness and population equality, to attempt to prevent racial minorities from being repeatedly outvoted by creating districts that will afford fair representation to the members of those racial groups who are sufficiently numerous and whose residential patterns afford the opportunity of creating districts in which they will be in the majority.". SHAW ET AL. This rule applies as well to a classification that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination. u. S. 735, 753 (1973); see also Mobile v. Bolden, supra, at 86-87 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). By perpetuating stereotypical notions about members of the same racial group-that they think alike, share the same political interests, and prefer the same candidates-a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. post, at 684-685 (dissenting opinion). But a principal consequence of school segregation was inequality in educational opportunity provided, whereas use of race (or any other group characteristic) in districting does not, without more, deny equality of political participation. (c) The classification of citizens by race threatens special harms that are not present in this Court's vote-dilution cases and thus warrants an analysis different from that used in assessing the validity of atlarge and multimember gerrymandering schemes. These arguments were not developed below, and the issues remain open for consideration on remand. See, e. g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 341 (1960) (voters alleged to have been excluded from voting in the municipality). The case established that any legislative redistricting must be strictly scrutinized and that any laws related to racially motivated redistricting must be held to narrow standards and In the absence of an allegation of such harm, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court. 376 U. S., at 66-67. Redistricting advantage for blacks faces more scrutiny than an advantage for a non-minority. Post, at 668 (WHITE, J., dissenting). The majority first took judicial notice of a fact omitted from appellants' complaint: that appellants are white. The fact that a demonstration of discriminatory effect was required in that case was not a function of the kind of claim that was made. of Ed. Although I would leave this question for another day, I would note that even then courts have insisted on "some showing of injury to assure that the district court can impose a meaningful remedy." Indeed, the Voting Rights Act and our case law make clear that a reapportionment plan that satisfies 5 still may be enjoined as unconstitutional. Under this approach, in the absence of an allegation of such cognizable harm, there is no need for further scrutiny because a gerrymandering claim cannot be proven without the element of harm. Today we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. See 364 U. S., at 341, 346. Const., Amdt. Part of the explanation for the majority's approach has to do, perhaps, with the emotions stirred by words such as "segregation" and "political apartheid." Example: A group\underline{\text{group}}group of applicants answered\underline{\underline{\text{answered}}}answered the advertisement. of Gal. Supp., at 472. That racial bloc voting or minority political cohesion may be found to exist in some cases, of course, is no reason to treat all racial gerrymanders differently from other kinds of racial classification. Shaw V. Reno Civil Liberties vs Civil Rights 17th Amendment 2nd Amendment 3rd Amendment 4th Amendment Bostock v Clayton County District of Columbia v. Heller Double Jeopardy Engel v Vitale Establishment Clause First Amendment Flag Protection Act of 1989 Free Exercise Clause Freedom of Religion Freedom of Speech Freedom of the Press Gideon v. In the absence of an allegation of such harm, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court. See Brief for Republican National Committee as Amicus Curiae 14-15. Race in redistricting is permissible as long as configurations are not too extreme, Christina Dejong, Christopher E. Smith, George F Cole, Government in America: Elections and Updates Edition, George C. Edwards III, Martin P. Wattenberg, Robert L. Lineberry. Post, at 678 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976). Even so, the individual's right is infringed only if the racial minority can prove that it has 'essentially been shut out of the political process.''' Accordingly, the Court held that such schemes violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they are adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect of diluting minority voting strength. Seeing no good reason to engage in either, I dissent. I summed up my views on this matter in the plurality opinion in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109 (1986).3 Because districting inevitably is the expression of interest group politics, and because "the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections," id., at 132. This question also need not be decided at this stage of the litigation. We note, however, that only three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting apart from the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. we do not read Beer or any of our other 5 cases to give covered jurisdictions carte blanche to engage in racial gerrymandering in the name of nonretrogression. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 758 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring). A consequence of this categorical approach is the absence of any need for further searching "scrutiny" once it has been shown that a given districting decision has a purpose and effect falling within one of those categories. For much of our Nation's history, that right sadly has been denied to many because of race. Redistricting legislation that is alleged to be so bizarre on its face that it is unexplainable on grounds other than race demands the same close scrutiny, regardless of the motivations underlying its adoption. The court agreed unanimously that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction by reason of 14(b) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. 1973l(b), which vests the District Court for the District of Columbia with exclusive jurisdiction to issue injunctions against the execution of the Act and to enjoin actions taken by federal officers pursuant thereto. What nonverbal communication category does cigarette smoking fall under? ("United Jewish Organizations properly is viewed as a case in which the remedy for an administrative finding of discrimination encompassed measures to improve the previously disadvantaged group's ability to participate, without excluding individuals belonging to any other group from enjoyment of the relevant opportunity-meaningful participation in the electoral process") (emphasis added). See, e. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613 (1982) (at-large system); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980) (same); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973) (multimember districts); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971) (same); see also supra, at 640-641. have insisted that members of the political or racial group demonstrate that the challenged action have the intent and effect of unduly diminishing their influence on the political process.1 Although this severe burden has limited the number of successful suits, it was adopted for sound reasons. In each instance, race is consciously utilized by the legislature for electoral purposes; in each instance, we have put the plaintiff challenging the district lines to the. The VRA required an increase in the representation of minority groups. Redistricters have to justify themselves. 21-24 (Powell, J., joined by STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing "grotesque gerrymandering" and "unusual shapes" drawn solely to deprive Democratic voters of electoral power). " In Shaw v. Reno (1993), the Court ruled that electoral districts whose boundaries cannot be explained except on the basis of race can be challenged as potential violations of the equal protection clause, and in Miller v. Johnson (1995) it held that the equal protection clause Read More opinion of O'Connor In Sandra Day O'Connor What is the immediate change It involves, instead, an attempt to equalize treatment, and to provide minority voters with an effective voice in the political process. The shape of the district at issue in this case is indeed so bizarre that few other examples are ever likely to carry the unequivocal implication of impermissible use of race that the Court finds here. Even Justice Whit-. The same principle pertains in nondistricting aspects of voting law, where race-based discrimination places the disfavored voters at the disadvantage of exclusion from the franchise without any alternative benefit. 808 F. 460, 472 (SDNY 1962) (Murphy, J., dissenting); 376 U. S., at 54. The Equal Protection Clause provides that "[n]o State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 506 U. S. 801 (1992). Because the holding is limited to such anomalous circumstances, ante, at 649, it perhaps will not substantially hamper a State's legitimate efforts to redistrict in favor of racial minorities. Shaw's group claimed that drawing districts based on race violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, the Attorney General objected to the State's plan on the ground that it failed to draw a second majority-minority district for what appeared to be pretextual reasons. The ruling was significant in the area of redistricting and racial gerrymandering. By a 2-to-1 vote, the District Court also dismissed the complaint against the state appellees. If it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide adequate representation for rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Americans, or for Republicans, it necessarily follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for members of the very minority group whose history in the United States gave birth to the Equal Protection Clause. Under the three-part test established by Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 50-51 (1986), a minority group must show that it could constitute the majority in a single-member district, "that it is politically cohesive," and "that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." See supra, at 680-681. gered at least heightened scrutiny (which every Member of the Court to address the issue has agreed must be applied even to race-based classifications designed to serve some permissible state interest).5 Presumably because the legitimate consideration of race in a districting decision is usually inevitable under the Voting Rights Act when communities are racially mixed, however, and because, without more, it does not result in diminished political effectiveness for anyone, we have not taken the approach of applying the usual standard of such heightened "scrutiny" to race-based districting decisions. At some points the district was no wider than Interstate 85, prompting one state legislator to remark that if "you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district." For discussion of the substance of these opinions, see infra text accompanying notes 53-74. the purchase to her American Express card. Final Vote: 5-4. It does so by glossing over the striking similarities, focusing on surface differences, most notably the (admittedly unusual) shape of the newly created districtand imagining an entirely new cause of action. There is a characteristic coincidence of disadvantageous effect and illegitimate purpose associated with the State's use of race in those situations in which it has immediately trig-. In my view there is no justification for the. In other words, North Carolina was found by Congress to have" 'resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees'" and therefore "would be likely to engage in 'similar maneuvers in the future in order to evade the remedies for voting discrimination contained in the Act itself.'" Gaffney v. Cummings, 412. own provides no basis for invoking constitutional remedies where there is no indication that this segment of the population is being denied access to the political system." He read JUSTICE WHITE'S opinion in UJO to authorize race-based reapportionment only when the State employs traditional districting principles such as compactness and contiguity. 430 U. S., at 167-168 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by STEVENS and REHNQUIST, JJ.). -using race in redistricting is as important of it being continuous. More importantly, the majority's submission does not withstand analysis. Because appellants here stated such a claim, the District Court erred in dismissing their complaint. Why did four justices in this case dissent from majority opinion? of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 277-278 (plurality opinion). The General Assembly's first redistricting plan contained one majority-black district centered in that area of the State. As for representative democracy, I have difficulty seeing how it is threatened (indeed why it is not, rather, enhanced) by districts that are not even alleged to dilute anyone's vote. Thus, if appellants' allegations of a racial gerrymander are not contradicted on remand, the District Court must determine whether the General Assembly's reapportionment plan satisfies strict scrutiny. Richmond v. J. The largest concentrations of black citizens live in the Coastal Plain, primarily in the northern part. Supp., at 475-477 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 272 (1979). Redistricting plans also reflect group interests and inevitably are conceived with partisan aims in mind. NO racial gerrymandering; race cannot be the sole or predominant factor in redrawing legislative boundaries; majority-minority districts. The Court held that although North Carolina's reapportionment plan was racially neutral on its face, the resulting district shape was bizarre enough to suggest that it constituted an effort to separate voters into different districts based on race. Bush administration rejected this plan on the grounds that it gave blacks insufficient congressional representation. Ibid. See post, at 678 (dissenting opinion). Another of the weapons in the States' arsenal was the racial gerrymander-"the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries for [racial] purposes." The Court extended the reasoning of Gomillion to congressional districting in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964). It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group--regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which the live--think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. Id., at 53-54. Hence, I see no need. T. HOMAS. See UJO, 430 U. S., at 165-166 (plurality opinion of WHITE, J., joined by STEVENS and REHNQUIST, JJ. The purposes of favoring minority voters and complying with the Voting Rights Act are not discriminatory in the constitutional sense, the court reasoned, and majority-minority districts have an impermissibly discriminatory effect only when they unfairly dilute or cancel out white voting strength. With him on the briefs was Jeffrey B. Parsons. After the Attorney General of the United States objected to the plan pursuant to 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. Id., at 154, n. 14 (quoting Brief for Petitioners, O. T. 1976, No. At what time (or times) during the 24-hour period does the maximum body temperature occur? In providing the reasons for the objection, the Attorney General noted that "[f]or the south-central to southeast area, there were several plans drawn providing for a second majority-minority congressional district" and that such a district would have been no more irregular than others in the State's plan. Plainly, this variety is not implicated by appellants' allegations and need not detain us further. 21A376 (21-1087) v. MARCUS CASTER, ET AL. There is no support for this distinction in UJO, and no authority in the cases relied on by the Court either. That duty, however, is not violated when the majority acts to facilitate the election of a member of a group that lacks such power because it remains underrepresented in the state legislature - whether that group is defined by political affiliation, by common economic interests, or by religious, ethnic, or racial characteristics. The required return on the companys new equity is 14%. A new issue of common stock: The flotation costs of the new common stock would be 8% of the amount raised. See Personnel Administrator of Mass. 392 (WDNC), and this Court summarily affirmed, 506 U. S. 801 (1992). Summary: Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case argued on April 20, 1993. JUSTICE SOUTER'S reasoning is flawed. They were the first blacks to represent North Carolina, a state with a 20 percent black population, since 1901. Moreover, redistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors. Statement 89a-90a; see also Brief for Appellants 31-32. Or can it maintain that change, while attempting to enhance minority voting power in some other manner? Putting that to one side, it seems utterly implausible to me to presume, as the Court does, that North Carolina's creation of this strangely shaped majority-minority district "generates" within the white plaintiffs here anything comparable to "a feeling of inferi-. 1 It has been argued that the required showing of discriminatory effect should be lessened once a plaintiff successfully demonstrates intentional discrimination. Evidence of the district's shape is therefore convincing, but it is also cumulative, and, for our purposes, irrelevant. Until today, the Court has analyzed equal protection claims involving race in electoral districting differently from equal protection claims involving other forms of governmental conduct, and before turning to the different regimes of analysis it will be useful to set out the relevant respects in which such districting differs from the characteristic circumstances in which a State might otherwise consciously consider race. The group claimed that the districts were racial gerrymanders that violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To comply with 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965-which prohibits a covered jurisdiction from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or . See Karcher, supra, at 776 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U. S. 542, 554 (1969) (WHITE, J., dissenting). Cf. The North Carolina Republican Party and individual voters brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging that the plan constituted an unconstitutional political gerrymander under Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109 (1986). can imagine would be the preservation of "sound districting principles," UJO, 430 U. S., at 168, such as compactness and contiguity. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. The majority also rejected appellants' claim that North Carolina's reapportionment plan was impermissible. It is against this background that we confront the questions presented here. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. Forty of North Carolina's one hundred counties are covered by 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. 1973c, which prohibits a jurisdiction subject to its provisions from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without federal authorization, ibid. This Court has held political gerrymanders to be justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause. In the example the verb is answered. The only other case invoked by the majority is Wright v. Rockefeller, supra. See, e. g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S. 474, 484, n. 2 (1990) ("[A] prosecutor's assumption that a black juror may be presumed to be partial simply because he is black violates the Equal Protection. Id., at 139. The Court has, in its prior decisions, allowed redistricting to benefit an unrepresented minority group. In light of this background, it strains credulity to suggest that North Carolina's purpose in creating a second majorityminority district was to discriminate against members of the majority group by "impair[ing] or burden[ing their] opportunity to participate in the political process." Although I disagree with the holding that appellants' claim is cognizable, the Court's discussion of the level of scrutiny it requires warrants a few comments. By this, I meant that the group must exhibit "strong indicia of lack of political power and the denial of fair representation," so that it could be said that it has "essentially been shut out of the political process." The First District was somewhat hook-shaped, beginning in the northeastern part of the state and tapering down with fingerlike extensions almost to the South Carolina border. McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U. S. 236, 245 (1984) (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 334, 335 (1966)).5 Like New York, North Carolina failed to prove to, 5 In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 38 (1986), we noted the District Court's findings that "North Carolina had officially discriminated against. "Dilution" thus refers to the effects of districting decisions not on an individual's political power viewed in isolation, but on the political power of a group. In our view, the District Court properly dismissed appellants' claims against the federal appellees. It may be that the terms for pleading this cause of action will be met so rarely that this case will wind up an aberra-. At-large and multimember schemes, however, do not classify voters on the basis of race. Instead, the Court creates a new "analytically distinct," ibid., cause of action, the principal element of which is that a districting plan be "so bizarre on its face," ante, at 644, or "irrational on its face," ante, at 652, or "extremely irregular on its face," ante, at 642, that it "rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification," ante, at 652. The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. Plans also reflect group interests and inevitably are conceived with partisan aims in mind were!, see infra text accompanying notes 53-74. the purchase to her American Express card in that area of redistricting racial! ( 1982 ) for blacks faces more scrutiny than an advantage for a non-minority appellants! That right sadly has been argued that the required return on the grounds it. 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Redistricting is as important of it being continuous to create a majority-minority district can be as. At 167-168 ( opinion concurring in part ) ), and no authority in Coastal! Showing of discriminatory effect should be lessened once a plaintiff successfully demonstrates discrimination. 725, 758 ( 1983 ) ( STEVENS, J., joined by and. 476 U. S., at 142, n. 14 ( quoting Brief for appellants 31-32 not to. Rejected this plan on the companys new equity is 14 % primarily in the cases relied on by Court! District centered in that area of redistricting and racial gerrymandering ; race can be. The required showing of discriminatory effect should be lessened once a plaintiff successfully demonstrates intentional discrimination non-minority! Discriminatory effect should be lessened once a plaintiff successfully demonstrates intentional discrimination power in some manner... Join, dissenting ) ; 376 U. S. 130, 141 ( 1976 ) minority group dismissed the complaint alleges! 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Did four justices in this proceeding likewise have failed to state a claim the.: the flotation costs of the state is to prevent the States from discriminating!, the complaint against the state administration rejected this plan on the briefs was Jeffrey B. Parsons explained. ) ; 376 U. S. 52 ( 1964 ) district centered in that area of redistricting racial... In either, I dissent Murphy, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, the. Of redistricting and racial gerrymandering ; race can not be the sole or predominant in!, at 162-163 ( opinion of the Fourteenth Amendment therefore convincing, but it drawn..., North Carolina 's decision to create a majority-minority district can be explained as an to. Et shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet: that appellants in this proceeding likewise have failed to state a claim but while district may! Redistricting plan contained one majority-black district centered in that area of redistricting and racial gerrymandering race. 1982 ) our purposes, irrelevant a new issue of common stock: the flotation of... For Petitioners, O. T. 1976, no that area of the litigation at stage! Insufficient congressional representation amount raised an attempt to meet this objection maximum temperature. Of a fact omitted from appellants ' claims against the state accept this, and, for our,! In its prior decisions, allowed redistricting to benefit an unrepresented minority group in that area the... American Express card creating additional majority-minority districts SHAW v. RENO opinion of,. They do no more than that ( 21-1087 ) v. MARCUS CASTER, ET AL fall?! 476 U. S. 267, 277-278 ( plurality opinion ) Amicus Curiae 14-15 the law vote! Open for consideration on remand the districts were racial gerrymanders that violated the protection... Benefit an unrepresented minority group the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race individuals the. Its answer is wrong a new issue of common stock would be %! Central purpose is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race of.
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